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NOTES
REPUDIATION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN FEDERATIONS
The doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity has no ex-
press constitutional basis, but is wholly the product of judicial
construction.1 It traces ultimately to expressions in McCulloch
v. Maryland,2 where the United States Supreme Court inval-
idated a discriminatory state statute which singled out trans-
actions of the Federal government as a subject of taxation. The
correctness of the strict holding of that case is unquestioned;
but the extensive opinion, which constituted virtually a mono-
graph on the science of government, abounded in dicta (includ-
ing the aphorism that "the power to tax involves the power to
destroy"), the repercussions of which could not then have been
foreseen. That case involved federal immunity from state tax-
ation. The converse situation was presented by Collector v. Day,
which propounded a broad principle of implied reciprocal tax
immunity even as to non-discriminatory levies. This doctrine has
since met with severe criticism,, and its scope has been limited
drastically.5 It has been deemed applicable only where the func-
tion involved was strictly or essentially governmental, and has
been repudiated where no direct burden was placed on the gov-
ernment,7 and where the person assessed was an independent
1. See McCulloch v. Maryland (U. S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 316; Graves v. New
York (1939) 59 S. Ct. 595; 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.
1927) 989; Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924) 217, see. 90.
2. (U. S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
8. (U. S. 1870) 11 Wall. 113.
4. Department of Justice, Taxation of Government Bondholders and
Employees: The Immunity Rule and the Sixteenth Amendment (1938) 84;
Willis, Constitutional Law (1936) 236; Freedman, Government-Owned Cor-
p rations and Intergovernmental Tax Immunity (1938) 24 WASHINGTON U.
w QUARTERLY 46; Comment (1932) 7 St. John's L. Rev. 143; Boudin,
Taxation of Governmental Instrumentalities (1933) 22 Geo. L. J. 1, 254;
Harrow, Some Aspects of the Taxation of Federal and State Instrumen-
talities (1935) 10 St. John's L. Rev. 45; Watkins, The Power of the State
and Federal Governments to Tax One Another (1937) 24 Va. L. Rev. 475;
Comment (1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1422; Comment (1938) 37 Mich. L.
Rev. 88.
5. See chronological collection of cases in Wasserman, Reciprocal Tax
Immunity, Its Rise and Fall (1939) 62 N. J. L. J. 125.
6. Ambrosini v. United States (1902) 187 U. S. 1; South Carolina v.
United States (1905) 199 U. S. 437; Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States
(1930) 283 U. S. 570; Ohio v. Helvering (1933) 292 U. S. 360; Helvering v.
Gerhardt (1938) 304 U. S. 405; Comment (1936) 21 Va. L. Rev. 120; Note
(1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1323.
7. Willcuts v. Bunn (1930) 282 U. S. 216; Burnet v. Jergins Trust
(1932) 288 U. S. 508; Helvering v. Mountain Products Corp. (1938) 303
U. S. 376; Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co. (1938) 303 U. S. 362; Comment
(1938) 12 Temple L. Q. 403; Comment (1938) 11 Tex. L. Rev. 120.
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contractor rather than a government employee.8 Recently the
Court has flatly overruled Collector v. Day and has probably
abandoned the doctrine of implied reciprocal tax immunity by
the decision in Graves v. New York.9 That case involved a state
income tax on the salary of an employee of the Home Owners'
Loan Corp., which the Court stated was an agency of the Fed-
eral government employed in performing an essential govern-
mental function. One may anticipate that, until the legislative
base for permissible taxation is extended, no such claim of im-
munity will hereafter be sustained unless the tax involved is
clearly discriminatory or unduly interferes with governmental
operations. It must, however, be noted thatthe Graves case does
not affect the holding of MeCulloch v. Maryland. It is not pro-
posed here to trace the history of intergovernmental tax im-
munities which has been treated elsewhere many times.10 The
outright rejection by the Graves case of this frequently criti-
cized doctrine is in striking contrast with the slow and gradual
development which has normally characterized the Anglo-Amer-
ican judicial process.- When an existing theory is economically
undesirable and jurally untenable, the more drastic policy would
seem preferable to the cautious approach characterized by dis-
tinctions and exceptions22 and exemplified by the previous recip-
rocal tax immunity decisions. Of late, the Supreme Court has
tended away from the traditional technique of oblique with-
drawal and has frankly overruled doctrines which appeared to
8. Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell (1926) 269 U. S. 514; James v. Dravo
Contracting Co. (1937) 302 U. S. 134; Comment (1937) 23 WASHINGTON U.
LAW QUARTERLY 280; Note (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 707; Note (1938) 15
Tern. L. Rev. 247; Comment (1938) 12 Temple L. Rev. 514.
9. (1939) 59 S. Ct. 595.
10. 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 989; 2 Cooley
Taxation (4th ed. 1924) 1286-1363, sees. 606-648; Note (1931) 17 ST. LOUIS
L. Rsv w 38; Freedman, Government-Owned Corporations and Intergovern-
mental Tax Immunity (1938) 24 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 46;
Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers
of the States (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 472, 721, 932, and 32 Harv. L.
Rev. 234, 374, 634, 902; Boudin, The Taxation of Governmental Instru-
mentalities (1933) 22 Geo. L. J. 1,254; Comment (1938) 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
679; Comment (1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1422; Note (1937) 23 Va. L. Rev.
922; Hayes and Rothfield, Constitutionality of a State Tax on Gross Income
Derived from Contracts with the Federal Government (1937) 3 John
Marshall L. Q. 211; Watkins, The Power of the State and Federal Govern-
ments to Tax One Another (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 475; Hervey, Judicial
Delimitation of the Exemption of Federal Instrumentalities from State
Taxation (1938) 12 Temp. L. Q. 291; Note (1938) 6 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
646.
11. See Holland, Jurisprudence (1910) 55; Cardozo, The Nature of the
Judicial Process (1927) 142; Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common
Law (1929) 302; Radin, Anglo-American Legal History (1936) 343.
12. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1927) 150.
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it of doubtful soundness. 13 But even though one agrees with Mr.
Justice Frankfurter that in an appropriate instance, such as
the Graves case, overt repudiation is better than covert aban-
donment, he should not overlook the jurist's admonition in the
concurring opinion that "A reversal of a long current of deci-
sions can be justified only if rooted in the Constitution itself as
an historic document designed for a developing nation."14
The concept of intergovernmental tax immunity had a com-
parable historical development in Australia 5 and Canada,16 the
other principal federations within the common-law system. The
relative rapidity with which the doctrine was abandoned in
these jurisdictions merits examination.
Under the British North American Act, 1867,17 which is Can-
ada's "Constitution," the powers of government are distributed
between the provinces and the Dominion in a manner roughly
analogous to the system prevailing in the United States.'8 There
is the substantial difference, however, that the provinces possess
only delegated powers, while the residuary power is vested in
the Dominion." Taxation of property belonging to the Dominion
or to the provinces is expressly forbidden ;20 but, in other re-
13. Of the several illustrations available the following are representa-
tive: Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal (1932) 286 U. S. 123, overruling Long v.
Rockwood (1928) 277 U. S. 142; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1936)
300 U. S. 379, overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S.
525; Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U. S. 64, overruling Swift
v. Tyson (U. S. 1842) 16 Pet. 1; Rochester Telephone Co. v. Federal Com-
munication Comm. (1939) 59 S. Ct. 754, permitting judicial review of
"negative" orders of administrative agencies; Note (1939) -24 WASHINGTON
U. LAW QuARTERLY 591; Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication-
A Study of Modified and Overruled Decisions (1932) 46 Harv. L. R. 361,
593, 795; Comment (1938) 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 697.
14. Concurring opinion in Graves v. New York (1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 595,
602.
15. Kennedy, Essays in Constitutional Law (1934) 115; Kennedy, Some
Aspects of Canadian and Australian Federal Constitutional Law (1930)
15 Corn. L. Q. 345, 352; Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Australia (2d ed. 1910) 421.
16. Lefroy, Canada's Federal System (1913) 414; Kennedy, Essays in
Constitutional Law (1934) 109; Kennedy, Some Aspects of Canadian and
Australian Federal Constitutional Law (1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 345, 348;
See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Graves v. New York
(1939) 59 S. Ct. 595, 603.
17. 30 Vict. c. 3.
18. (1867) 30 Vict. c. 3, sees. 91, 92, 93, 94, 95.
19. (1867) 30 Vict. c. 3, secs. 91 and 92; Tennant v. Union Bank of
Canada [1894] A. C. 31; Attorney General for Canada v. Attorneys Gen-
eral for the Provinces [1898] A. C. 700; Department of Justice, Taxation
of Government Bondholders and Employees (1938) 73.
20. (1867) 30 Vict. c. 3, sec. 125.
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spects, the doctrine of reciprocal tax immunity must be derived,
if at all, by implication.21
Imposition of a municipal income tax on the salary of a mem-
ber of the Dominion Parliament was held invalid in 1878,22 on
the grounds of possible diminution of efficiency of Dominion
officers and unwarranted interference with one government by
another. McCulloch v. Maryland was referred to as a masterly
solution of a similar problem in the "neighboring republic.1128
Indeed, there is reason to believe that then, and on other occa-
sions, the great reputation and political wisdom of Marshall
greatly impressed the judges and impelled them to an uncritical
assent to his assertions. 2' The provincial courts elsewhere
adopted this view, 25 and it became the established rule in Canada
that provincial and local taxing power could not reach salaries
of Dominion officials 21
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Privy Council was called
on to consider the problem27 until Bank of Toronto v. Lambe in
1887.28 In that case plaintiff bank, a Dominion corporation, chal-
lenged a Quebec tax, the amount of which was determined by
paid up capital and the number of its branches.29 Insisting that
the tax might impinge on the Federal banking control, the bank
relied heavily on Marshall's proposition that "the power to tax
involves the power to destroy." The Privy Council rejected this
argument and sanctioned non-discriminatory provincial taxa-
tion of Dominion agencies. The doctrine of "necessary prohi-
21. Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887) 19 App. Cas. 575; Abbott v. St.
John (1908) 40 Can. Sup. Ct. 597.
22. Leprohon v. Ottawa (1878) 2 Ont. App. 522; Moore, The Privy
Council and the Australian Constitution (1907) 23 Law Q. Rev. 373;
Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation of Canada (1914) 28 Harv. L. Rev.
565, 570.
23. Patterson, J., in Leprohon v. Ottawa (1878) 2 Ont. App. 522, 567.
24. Higgins, McCulloch v. Maryland in Australia (1905) 18 Harv. L. Rev.
559. The point made is that both the Canadian and Australian Courts may
have been so affected.
25. Evans v. Hudson (1877) 22 Lower Can. Jur. 268; Ex parte Owen
(1881) 20 N. B. R. 487; Ackman v. Moncton (1884) 24 N. B. R. 103;
Coates v. Moncton (1886) 25 N. B. R. 605; Ex parte Burke (1896) 34
N. B. R. 200; Regina v. Bowell (1896) 4 B. C. R. 498; Ex parte Kilam
(1898) 34 N. B. R. 530.
26. Kennedy, Some Aspects of Canadian and Australian Constitutional
Law (1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 345; Kennedy, Essays in Constitutional Law
(1934) 109-112.
27. Department of Justice, Taxation of Government Bondholders and
Employees (1938) 74.
28. 12 App. Cas. 575; Kennedy and Wells, The Law of the Taxing
Power in Canada (1931) 65; Kennedy, Essays in Constitutional Law
(1934) 109.
29. Quebec Act (1882) 45 Vict. c. 22.
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bition" was unequivocally repudiated, McCulloch v. Mzryland
characterized as inconsistent with British constitutional law,3
and the provincial parliaments' plenitude of power in the per-
formance of their legal functions held not to be restricted by
consideration of potential abuse. The maxim of Marshall was
summarily dismissed on the basis of alleged constitutional dif-
ferences. In Abbot v. St. John,31 decided in 1908, the Canadian
Supreme Court concurred in this disapproval of the earlier
Canadian rule and sustained the City of St. John in its imposi-
tion of an income tax on the salary of a Dominion Customs
Officer. The doctrine of implied reciprocal immunity from non-
discriminatory taxes was negatived without distinguishing ear-
lier cases in the provincial courts, and exemption of Federal
employees from bearing a share of the costs of local government
was stigmatized as gross injustice. Davies, J., casually dis-
missed the potential abuse doctrine with the remark that "if,
under the guise of exercising power of taxation, confiscation of
a substantial part of official and other salaries were attempted,
it would be then time enough to consider the question and not
to assume beforehand such a suggested misuse of the power."8 2
Another justice stated: "No attempt is made to seize or appro-
priate the income itself, or to anticipate its payment."'33 It was
accordingly held that the tax involved no real interference with
the Dominion government and that the Dominion's power over
the salaries of the Dominion official had no appreciable connec-
tion with "the fiscal burdens incident to provincial or municipal
citizenship." 3 Thus, the Canadian Supreme Court scotched de-
cisively, within little more than twenty-five years after its in-
ception, the emerging recognition by provincial courts of the
"implied prohibition" doctrine of reciprocal tax immunity. Inter-
governmental taxes may now be levied8" subject, of course, to
30. Kennedy, Some Aspects of Canadian and Australian Federal Con-
stitutional Law (1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 345; Kennedy, Essays in Constit -
tional Law (1934) 109.
31. 40 Can. Sup. Ct. 597; Lefroy, Canada's Federal System (1913) 417;
Department of Justice, Taxation of Government Bondholders and Employees
(1938) 75.
32. (1908) 40 Can. Sup. Ct. 597, 607.
33. Maclennan, J., 40 Can. Sup. St. at 616; Department of Justice, Tax-
ation of Government Bondholders and Employees (1938) 75.
34. Duff, J., 40 Can. Sup. Ct. at 618.
35. Lefroy, Canada's Federal System (1913) 411; Kennedy, Some As-
pects of Canadian and Australian Federal Constitutional Law (1930) 15
Corn. L. Q. 345; Kennedy and Wells, The Law of the Taxing Power in
Canada (1931) 79; Kennedy, Essays in Constitutional Law (1934) 109-115.
This point is illustrated by several cases of state taxation of Dominion
corporations: Brewers' & Maltsters' Ass'n v. The Attorney General [1897]
A. C. 231; Workmen's Compensation Board v. Canadian Pac. Ry. [19201
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the specific constitutional provisions previously mentioned, and
to the continuing rule prohibiting discriminatory taxes s or
taxes calculated to assist in provincial exclusion of Dominion
corporationsM.a
The development of this phase of the law in Australia has
been characterized by confusion. 38  The Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution Act of 1900,39 patterned more or less in-
tentionally after the Constitution of the United States,' 0 dele-
gates specific powers to the Commonwealth and leaves the resid-
uary powers in the states. 1 As under the British North Amer-
ican Act, only taxation of governmental property is expressly
forbidden.'2 Divergence of view as to tax immunity of instru-
mentalities was manifested from the outset. In 1904, the High
Court of Australia upheld exemption of salaries of Common-
wealth offices from state taxation,43 citing McCulloch v. May-
land and distinctly recognizing the doctrine of implied immun-
ity. The corollary exemption of state agencies from federal tax-
ation was likewise recognized." The views expressed in McCul-
A. C. 184; and see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Graves
v. New York (1939) 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 603.
. 36. Halifax v. Lyall & Sons Co. (1922) 65 D. L. R. 305; Department of
Justice, Taxation of Government Bondholders and Employees (1938) 75.
* 37. John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton [1915] A. C. 330; Great West Sad-
dlery Co. v. The King [1921] 2 A. C. 91; Department of Justice, Taxation
of Government Bondholders and Employees (1938) 75.
38. Higgins, McCulloch v. Maryland in Australia (1905) 18 Harv. L.
Rev. 559; Moore, The Privy Council and the Australian Constitution (1907)
23 Law Q. Rev. 373.
39. (1900) 63 and 64 Vict. c. 12.
40. Sweetman, Australian Constitutional Developments (1925) 337;
Warner, Introduction to Some Problems of Australian Federalism (1933)
2. The truth of this assertion was recognized by the Australian judiciary
in Australiasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
v. Howe (1922) 31 C. L.'R. 290, 330.
41. (1900) 63 and 64 Viet. c. 12 sees. 51, 107; Higgins, McCulloch v.
Maryland in Australia (1905) 18 Harv. L. Rev. 559; Moore, The Constitu-
tion of The Commonwealth of Australia (2d ed. 1910) 65; Department of
Justice, Taxation of Government Bondholders and Employees (1938) 77.
42. (1900) 63 and 64 Vict. e. 12, see. 114.
43. D'Emden v. Pedder (1904) 1 C. L. R. 91; Moore, The Constitution
of the Commonwealth of Australia (2d ed. 1910) Kennedy, Some Aspects
of Canadian and Australian Federal Constitutional Law (1930) 15 Corn.
L. Q. 345; Kennedy, Essays in Constitutional Law (1934) 117; Comment
(1907) 20 Harv. L. Rev. 494.
44. Deakin v. Webb (1904) 1 C. L. R. 585, 10 A. L. R. 237; Moore, The
Privy Council and the Australian Constitution (1907) 23 Law Q. Rev. 373;
Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (2d ed. 1910)
428. Later cases illustrating the application of this doctrine either to states
or to the Commonwealth: Municipal Council of Sydney v. Commonwealth(1904) 1 C. L. R. 208; Roberts v. Ahern (1904) 1 C. L. R. 406; Common-
wealth v. New South Wales (1906) 3 C. L. R. 807; The Federated Almal-
gamated Government Ry. and Tramway Serv. Ass'n v. The New South
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loch v. Maryand, Collector v. Day, and their satellite decisions,
were thus incorporated into the Australian constitutional
fabric.45 On the other hand, in Wollaston's case,46 the Supreme
Court of Victoria rejected the doctrine, remarking that the
Crown's check on legislation obviated the dangers against which
the American courts had to guard.
The development of the constitutional principle took a pecu-
liar course at this point by reason of a rule of appellate practice
which permitted a state supreme court to certify appeals to
either the High Court of the Commonwealth or the Privy Coun-
cil.47 After the State of Victoria adopted the view of the High
Court and reversed its own prior holding,48 a case in point was
appealed to the Privy Council in 1907. In this case, the doctrine
of implied immunity against non-discriminatory intergovern-
mental taxation was rejected.49 The court stressed the fact that
the tax did not interfere unduly with governmental operations
and was not discriminatory. The dictum in MeCulloch v. Mary-
land, which had previously been followed, was declared inappli-
Wales Ry. Traffic Employees Ass'n (1907) 4 C. L. R. 488; The King v.
Barger (1908) 6 C. L. R. 41; Commonwealth v. M'Kay (1908) 6 C. L. R.
72; The King v. Sutton (1908) 5 C. L. R. 789; Attorney General for
New South Wales v. Collector of Customs (1908) 5 C. L. R. 818. These
statutes went beyond mere taxation.
45. See cases cited supra, note 44; Higgins, McCulloch v. Maryland in
Australia (1905) 18 Harv. L. Rev. 559; Kennedy, Some Aspects of Canadian
and Australian Federal Constitutional Law (1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 345;
Kennedy, Essays in Constitutional Law (1934) 115; Department of Jus-
tice, Taxation of Government Bondholders and Employees (1938) 77-80.
46. (1902) 28 Viet. L. R. 357; Moore, The Privy Council and the Aus-
tralian Constitution (1907) 23 Law Q. Rev. 373; Moore, The Constitution
of the Commonwealth of Australia (2d ed. 1910) 424; see Comment (1907)
20 Harv. L. Rev. 494.
47. This is not expressly set out in the Constitutional Act of 1900, but
was established by Webb v. Outtrim [1907] A. C. 81, as a matter of con-
struction of 63 and 64 Vict. c. 12, secs. 73, 74. Its propriety is frequently
challenged: see Moore, The Privy Council and The Australian Constitution
(1907) 23 Law Q. Rev. 373; Wickersham, The Police Power, A Product of
the Rule of Reason (1914) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 297, 302; Haines, Judicial
Interpretation of the Constitution Act of the Commonwealth of Australia
(1917) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 595; Department of Justice, Taxation of Govern-
ment Bondholders and Employees (1938) 77, n. 292.
48. Webb v. Outtrim [1905] Vict. L. . 463.
49. Webb v. Outtrim [1907] A. C. 81; Comment (1907) 20 Harv. L. Rev.
494; Moore, The Privy Council and the Australian Constitution (1907) 23
Law Q. Rev. 373; Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia (2d ed. 1910) 427; Wiekersham, The Police Power, A Product of the
Rule of Reason (1914) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 297; Haines, Judicial Interpreta-
tion of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (1914) 30
Harv. L. Rev. 595; Kennedy, Some Aspects of the Canadian and Australian
Federal Constitutional Law (1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 345, 355; Kennedy,
Essays on Constitutional Law (1934) 118; Department of Justice, Taxa-
tion of Government Bondholders and Employees (1938) 79.
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cable because of an asserted fundamental difference in the Amer-
ican and Australian constitutional systems, to wit, the check of
the Crown over the Australian legislative process °0
If this decision had been followed, it would have eliminated
the doctrine from Australian constitutional law within three
years after its acceptance. The Australian High Court, however,
did not find the reasoning of Halsbury, who had spoken for the
Privy Council, to be persuasive and adhered to its former posi-
tion.5 1 The consequence was confusion, the High Court staunchly
supporting the American rule and the Privy Council rejecting
it.52
As a solution, the High Court in 1907 suggested federal legis-
lation which would abolish appeal from state courts to the Privy
Council and divest Federal employees of immunity from state
income taxation. 3 Statutes embodying both recommendations
were enacted in 1907,1' and judicially sustained shortly there-
after55
While the taxation of incomes of governmental employees was
thus removed from controversy, other aspects of the immunity
of instrumentalities doctrine continued to plague Commonwealth-
State relations for several years,58 until the doctrine was finally
disavowed in its entirety by the High Court in Amalgamated
Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co., Ltd2T That
case, which involved a conflict between state and federal stat-
utes,5 1 might well ha;ve been decided on more limited grounds.
However, the Court declared its adherence to the canon of liberal
construction, without resort to implications, as a, principle of
50. [1907] A. C. at 89.
51. Baxter v. Comm'r of Taxation (1907) 4 C. L. R. 1087; Department
of Justice, Taxation of Government Bondholders and Employees (1938) 79.
52. Moore, The Privy Council and the Australian Constitution (1907) 23
Law Q. Rev. 373; Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia (2d ed. 1910) 472; Kennedy, Some Aspects of Canadian and Aus-
tralian Federal Constitutional Law (1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 345, 355; Ken-
nedy, Essays in Constitutional Law (1934) 119.
53. Flint v. Webb (1907) 4 C. L. R. 1178; Department of Justice, Taxa-
tion of Government Bondholders and Employees (1938) 79.
54. The issue of immunity of salaries of federal employees was covered
by the Commonwealth Salaries Act, 1907, and the appellate issue by the
Judiciary Act, 1907.
55. Chaplin v. Comm'r of Taxes for South Australia (1911) 12 C. L. R.
375.
56. Department of Justice,' Taxation of Government Bondholders and
Employees (1938) 80.
57. (1920) 28 C. L. R. 129; Kennedy, Some Aspects of Canadian and
Australian Federal Constitutional Law (1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 345, 356;
Kennedy, Essays in Constitutional Law (1934) 120; Department of Jus-
tice, Taxation of Government Bondholders and Employees (1938) 81.
58. See (1900) 63 and 64 Vict. e. 12, sec. 109.
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constitutional interpretation. The doctrine of immunity of in-
strumentalities was characterized as one of political exigency
and expedience and not proper for judicial consideration. Ad-
mittedly, significant particular differences between the constitu-
tional and judicial systems of Canada, Australia, and the United
States exist;59 nevertheless, they are sufficiently alike to make
comparison worthwhile60 In all three, the implied immunity
doctrine was adopted and, after a rather uneasy existence, was
then abolished. This process, which in Australia required but
sixteen years,61 took thirty in Canada,62 and nearly seventy in
the United States."
On the principle, heretofore mentioned,' that summary repu-
diation of a poorly conceived or formulated judicial doctrine is
preferable to a policy of lingering attrition, the Australian and
Canadian record in this connection is better than the American.
It is to be hoped that we will not in other respects disregard the
available constitutional experience of those federations and delay
correction of our errors.
CARROLL J. DONOHUE.
THE NEGATIVE ORDER DOCTRINE: ROCHESTER TELEPHONE
CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES
On April 17, 1939, the "negative order doctrine"1 was un-
expectedly overruled by the Supreme Court, through Justice
Frankfurter, after a concise review of its scope, effects, and
value. In Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States,2 the Fed-
eral Communications Commission adjudged a telephone company
in Rochester, N. Y. under the "control" of the New York Tele-
59. Webb v. Outtrim [1907] A. C. 81.
60. Higgins, McCulloch v. Maryland in Australia (1905) 18 Harv. L. Rev.
559; Kennedy, Some Aspects of Canadian and Australian Federal Con-
stitutional Law (1930) 15 Corn. L. Q. 345; Kennedy, Essays in Constitu-
tional Law (1934) 109, 115; concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in Graves v. New York (1939) 59 S. Ct. 595, 603. This is illustrated
in Abel, Price Control by Government Competition in Anglo-American Fed-
erations (1938) 23 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 459.
61. 1904 to 1920.
62. 1878 to 1908.
63. 1871 to 1939.
64. See supra, note 13.
1. For general discussion see Note (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 766; Note (1939)
6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 277; Note (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 908; 2 Sharfman, The
Interstate Commerce Commission (1931) 406-417; McGuire, Judicial Re-
views of Administrative Decisions (1938) 26 Geo. L. J. 574; Rosenberry,
Power of the Courts to Set Aside Administrative Rules and Orders (1938)
24 A. B. A. J. 279; Comment (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 522.
2. (1939) 59 S. Ct. 754.
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